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Abstract. We introduce the Funding Game, in which m identical re-
sources are to be allocated among n selfish agents. Each agent requests
a number of resources xi and reports a valuation v˜i(xi), which verifiably
lower-bounds i’s true value for receiving xi items. The pairs (xi, v˜i(xi))
can be thought of as size-value pairs defining a knapsack problem with
capacity m. A publicly-known algorithm is used to solve this knapsack
problem, deciding which requests to satisfy in order to maximize the
social welfare.
We show that a simple mechanism based on the knapsack highest ratio
greedy algorithm provides a Bayesian Price of Anarchy of 2, and for the
complete information version of the game we give an algorithm that
computes a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in O(n2 log2m) time. Our
primary algorithmic result shows that an extension of the mechanism to
k rounds has a Price of Anarchy of 1 + 1
k
, yielding a graceful tradeoff
between communication complexity and the social welfare.
1 Introduction
Efficiently allocating resources among multiple potential recipients is a central
problem in both computer science and economics. In the mechanism design liter-
ature it is customary to use the power of currency exchange to provide incentives
for the agents to be truthful. However, it has been pointed out that assuming the
existence of currency in the model is not always justified ([21]). In the present
paper we initiate the study of mechanisms with verification, first introduced by
Nisan and Ronen in [19] for the job scheduling problem, for resource alloca-
tion problems in a setting without currency. This reveals an unexplored middle
ground area between the settings of the multiple choice knapsack problem and
that of multi-item auctions, which has some obvious practical applications.
The knapsack problem and its variations model the setting where the supplier
knows precisely what value the agents are getting from any number of items. This
can be thought of as a perfect verification mechanism, and selfishness does not
play a role. At the other extreme, work in algorithmic game theory has generally
considered the case where the supplier knows nothing about the agents’ valuation
and must provide incentives, typically by imposing payments, for the agents to
be truthful. In this paper we introduce the Funding Game, in which a supplier
distributes m identical resources among n agents, each of whom has a private
valuation function depending only on the number of items received. Each agent
requests a number of items xi, and specifies its value v˜i(xi) for these items,
which might be less that its real value vi(xi). The supplier can verify that the
valuations are not exaggerated, and uses a publicly known algorithm to allocate
the items to the agents. The supplier’s allocation algorithm has an impact on
the requests made by agents, and in effect, on the instance of the allocation
problem that must be solved. Therefore we desire a mechanism that encourages
agents to be relatively abstemious, or not too greedy in choosing their requests,
and thereby produces an allocation yielding near-optimal social welfare.
1.1 Motivation
Our model closely resembles a financing competition, where multiple contestants
apply for funding provided by one supplier. Contestants must write an applica-
tion, or proposal, showing how the resources requested are going to be used to
acquire the said value. The supplier is able to verify the veracity of the proposals
and disqualify any contestant that reports a higher valuation than justified. This
is the verification mechanism, and motivates our assumption that agents cannot
inflate the reported value. However, the supplier may not be able to verify that
the reported value is the maximum a contestant could obtain, since it may not
know the full capabilities of the contestant.
The verification mechanism can also be thought of as a set of laws or a
reputation system. If an agent obtains the requested items and does not bring
the reported value, the repercussions may outweigh any immediate gains. This
understanding of the verification mechanism also justifies the assumption that
agents cannot inflate their reported valuation.
1.2 Related work
We show how related literature fits in our setting, categorizing it along two or-
thogonal dimensions: the power of the verification mechanism and communica-
tion complexity, or metaphorically, soundness and completeness. Fig. 1 classifies
existing work within these dimensions.
No verification, full revelation. This is the most common assumption in the
algorithmic mechanism design literature. Multi-unit auctions model the situa-
tion where a verification mechanism does not exist and thus agents must be
assumed dishonest. Truthfulness can be achieved through VCG payments, but
doing so depends on solving the allocation problem optimally, which may be
intractable. Starting with the work of Nisan and Ronen [19], the field of algo-
rithmic mechanism design has sought to reconcile selfishness with computational
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complexity. Multi-unit auctions have been studied extensively in this context,
including truthful mechanisms for single-minded bidders [18, 7], and k-minded
bidders [16, 10, 11].
More recently Procaccia and Tennenholtz ([21]), initiated the study of strat-
egy proof mechanisms without money, which was followed by the adaptation
of many previously studied mechanism design problems to the non-monetary
setting ( [1], [2], [8], [12], [14], [17]).
No verification, partial revelation. The multi item allocation problem has also
been studied in the setting where dishonest agents only partially reveal their
valuation functions. The main question in this setting concerns the extent to
which limiting communication complexity affects mechanism efficiency. In [5, 6],
for example, bid sizes in a single-item auction are restricted to real numbers
expressed by k bits. In [9], agent valuation functions are only partially revealed
because full revelation would require exponential space in the number of items.
Partial verification, full revelation. Mechanisms with verification have been in-
troduced in [19] for selfish settings of the task scheduling problem. The authors
show that truthful mechanisms exist for this problem when the mechanism can
detect some of the lies, which is very natural in this setting. More recently, this
results were generalized to mechanisms that are collusion resistant ([20]), and to
more general optimization functions ([4], [3], [13]), as well as multi parameter
agents [23].
Full verification, full revelation. If the verification mechanism has full power to
ensure agents’ honesty and agents must report their full valuation functions, the
supplier has complete information and selfishness on the part of the recipients is
irrelevant. This setting can be modeled as a multiple-choice knapsack problem
solvable by FPTAS [15].
1.3 Contributions
This paper extends the study of mechanisms with partial verification to multi
unit resource allocation. Unlike the problems analyzed before, there are poly-
nomial time truthful mechanisms for multi unit auctions. However, these mech-
anisms require both full revelation of the agent type, which may be hard to
compute and communicate, and currency transfer, which may be impractical in
some scenarios. Our work uses the added power of verification to provide an
efficient approximation mechanism for scenarios where currency transfer cannot
be modeled.
We propose the highest-ratio greedy (HRG) mechanism for the Funding
Game, which provides a Bayesian PoA of 2 under the assumption that valuation
functions give diminishing marginal returns (Theorem 1). We also provide an
algorithm that computes the Nash equilibrium strategy profile in O(n2 log2m)
time and a best response protocol that converges to a Nash equilibrium profile.
We show that an extension of HRG to multiple rounds can arbitrarily strengthen
the pure PoA. In this extension, the supplier partitions the m items into k
carefully-sized subsets, and allocates them successively over k consecutive Fund-
ing Games. We show that this mechanism has a pure PoA of 1 + 1
k
, yielding
a graceful tradeoff between communication complexity and the social welfare
(Theorem 2).
2 Preliminaries
A single-round Funding Game is specified by a set of agents or players {1, ..., n},
a set of m identical resources or items, and for each agent i a valuation function
vi : {0, ...,m} → R
+
0 denoting the value i derives from receiving different numbers
of items. We assume all valuation functions satisfy vi(0) = 0, are nondecreasing,
and exhibit diminishing marginal returns:
vi(x) − vi(x− 1) ≥ vi(x+ 1)− vi(x)
A strategy or request of agent i is a pair si(xi) = (xi, v˜i(xi)) specifying the
number xi of items requested, and its valuation for these items. A request is
valid if v˜i(x) ≤ vi(x).
A strategy profile is an n-tuple of strategies s = (s1(x1), ..., sn(xn)). We de-
note by Si the set of valid strategies for agent i, and by S = S1×...×Sn the set of
valid strategy profiles. We denote by X = (X1, ..., Xn) an allocation of the items
to the players where Xi is the number of items allocated to player i. Let X be
the set of all valid allocations, i.e. all X such that
∑
i∈[n]Xi ≤ m. A mechanism
M : S → X is an allocation algorithm that takes as input a strategy profile
s and outputs an allocation X of the items to the players. We will denote by
XM (s) = (XM1 (s), ..., X
M
n (s)) the output of mechanismM for strategy profile s.
The payoff of player i with valuation vi is its valuation for the number of items
it has been allocated: uMi (vi; s) = vi(X
M
i (s)). If v = (v1, ..., vn) is a valuation
function profile we denote by OPT v an optimal allocation, by sw(OPT v) the
social welfare of the optimal allocation, and by swM (v; s) =
∑
i∈[n] u
M
i (vi; s)
the social welfare of strategy profile s. We use (s′i, s−i) to denote the strategy
profile s in which player ith strategy has been replaced by s′i.
A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium for a Funding Game with valuation
functions v if for any i and any s′i ∈ Si, u
M
i (vi; s) ≥ u
M
i (vi; s
′
i, s−i). The Price
of Anarchy (PoA) bounds the ratio of the optimal social welfare and the social
welfare of the worst Nash equilibrium in any Funding Game:
PoAM = sup
v, NE s
sw(OPT v)
swM (v; s)
In incomplete information games we assume that player i’s valuation function
vi is drawn from a set Vi of possible valuation functions, according to some
distribution Di. We denote by D = D1× ...×Dn the product distribution of all
players’ valuation functions. A strategy σi in an incomplete information game is
a mapping σi : Vi → Si from the set of the possible valuation functions to the
set of valid requests. Assuming that the distribution D is commonly known, the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a tuple of strategies σ = (σ1, ..., σn) such that, for
any player i, any valuation function vi ∈ Vi and any alternate pure strategy s
′
i:
Ev−i∼D−i [u
M
i (vi;σi(vi), σ−i(v−i)] ≥ Ev−i∼D−i [u
M
i (vi; s
′
i, σ−i(v−i)]
The Bayesian Price of Anarchy is defined as the ratio between the expected
optimal social welfare and that of the worst bayesian Nash equilibrium:
BPoA = sup
D, BNE σ
Ev∼D[sw
M (v;OPT v]
Ev∼D[swM (v;σ(v)]
3 Single-round games
We first observe that the mechanism that solves the induced integer knapsack
problem optimally has an unbounded PoA. This can be shown by the following
simple example. Assume that n items are to be allocated to n players with
valuation functions vi(x) = 1 + x ∗ ǫ for all i and x > 0. A Nash equilibrium
of this game is when all players request all items. The mechanism allocates all
items to one player resulting in a social welfare of 1+n ·ǫ. The optimal allocation
will allocate one item to each player for a social welfare of n.
For the remainder of this section we analyze the performance of a simple
greedy mechanism in a single shot game. The Highest Ratio Greedy (HRG)mech-
anism grants the requests in descending order according to the ratio vi(xi)/xi,
breaking ties in the favor of the player with lower index. If there are not enough
items available to satisfy a request completely, the request is satisfied partially.
This is exactly the greedy algorithm for the fractional knapsack problem. In this
section we show that both the pure and Bayesian PoA are 2. An interesting open
problem is whether a mechanism exist for the single round game that improves
this PoA. We make use of the notion of smooth games ([22]) which we review
below, cast to the Funding Games studied here. Since we are only considering
the Highest Ratio Greedy mechanism we will omit the superscript M from all
notations in this section.
Definition 1 (Smooth game [22]). A Funding Game is (λ, µ)-smooth with
respect to a choice function c∗ : V1× ...×Vn → S and the social welfare objective
if, for any valuation function profiles v and w and any strategy profile s that is
valid with respect to both v and w, we have:
n∑
i=1
ui(vi; c
∗
i (v), s−i) ≥ λ · sw(v; c
∗(v)) − µ · sw(w; s)
The choice function can be thought of as the optimal strategy profile, in our case
the strategy profile in which each player requests the number of items received
in an optimal allocation, when the valuation function profile is v.
Lemma 1. Let OPT v = (ov1 , ..., o
v
n) be an optimal allocation for valuation pro-
file v and O : V1 × ... × Vn → S be the optimal strategy choice function, with
O(v) = ((ovi , vi(o
v
i ))i∈[n]). The Funding Games are (1, 1)-smooth with respect to
O and the social welfare objective.
Proof. We will use oi instead of either request (o
v
i , vi(o
v
i )) or integer o
v
i . It will
be clear from context whether oi stands for a request or an integer.
Fix valuation function profiles v andw. For a strategy profile s valid with respect
to both v and w we show that
∑n
i=1 ui(vi; oi, s−i) ≥ sw(v;O(v)) − sw(w; s).
Let A = {i : ui(vi; oi, s−i) < ui(vi;O(v))} be the set of players that are allocated
more items in the optimal allocation than in profile (oi, s−i). It is enough to show
that
∑
i∈A ui(vi; oi, s−i) + sw(w; s) ≥
∑
i∈A ui(vi;O(v)).
For each player i ∈ A, the value per allocated item at profile (oi, s−i) is at least
vi(oi)
oi
since by definition i is being allocated less than oi items, and the valuation
functions are concave. Then, ui(vi; oi, s−i) ≥
vi(x
∗
i )
x∗
i
· Xi(oi, s−i). By definition,
each player i ∈ A would be allocated fewer items than oi.
Therefore the requests in s−i that have a better value per item ratio sum up
to m −Xi(c
∗
i (v), s−i) items. Since the strategy profile s is assumed to be valid
with respect to valuation function profile w, the valuations expressed in s are at
most equal to the valuations w. We can conclude that for any i ∈ A
sw(w; s) ≥ (m−Xi(oi, s−i)) ·
vi(oi)
oi
Then for any i ∈ A, ui(vi; oi, s−i)+sw(w; s) ≥ m·
vi(oi)
oi
. This is true in particular
for player j ∈ A with the highest value per item ratio
vj(oj)
oj
. Therefore∑
i∈A
ui(vi; oi, s−i) + sw(w; s) ≥ uj(vj ; oj , s−j) + sw(w; s)
≥ m ·
vj(oj)
oj
≥
∑
i∈A
ui(vi;O(v))
which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. Both the pure and Bayesian Price of Anarchy for the Funding
Games are equal to 2.
Proof. Since the Funding Games are (1, 1)-smooth with respect to an optimal
allocation, the extension theorem in [22] guarantees that the BPoA is bounded by
2. We now show that the pure PoA is arbitrarily close to 2. Consider the Funding
Game with m items and two players with valuation functions v1(x) = m and
v2(x) = x ∀x > 0. One possible Nash equilibrium strategy is for both players to
request all items. Since the value per item ratios are equal, only the first player
will be allocated, for a social welfare of m. The optimal solution allocates one
item to the first player and m− 1 items to the second player for a social welfare
of 2m− 1. Taking m large enough leads to a PoA arbitrarily close to 2. ⊓⊔
3.1 Complexity of computing the Nash equilibrium
We now present an algorithm that finds the Nash equilibrium in the full infor-
mation setting in O(n2 log2m) time. For each player i we use binary search to
find the largest request (αi, vi(αi)) that passes the isSatisfiable test. The isSatis-
fiable function below assures that regardless of the other players requests, there
will be at least αi items available when the request of player i is considered
by the greedy algorithm. It is easy to see that for the resulting strategy profile
each player receives exactly as many items as requested and that all items are
allocated. We need to show that if player i increases its request then it will not
receive more items. By the construction of αj , for any player j 6= i, player j will
receive at least αj items regardless of the requests of the other players. Therefore
player i cannot receive more than αi = m−
∑
j 6=i αj by changing its request.
Algorithm 1 isSatisfiable (i, xi)
for all j < i do
xj ← max{x ∈ [m] :
vj (x)
x
≥ vi(αi)
αi
}
end for
for all j > i do
xj ← max{x ∈ [m] :
vj (x)
x
> vi(αi)
αi
}
end for
return true if
∑
j 6=i xj ≤ m− αi else false
4 Multiple-round games
In this section we present our main algorithmic result. We extend the Funding
Game introduced in the previous section to multiple rounds, and we show that
the PoA of a k-round Funding Game is 1+ 1
k
, yielding a graceful tradeoff between
mechanism complexity and the social welfare. In a k-round Funding Game, the
supplier partitions the m items into k bundles, which are distributed among the
n agents in k successive Funding Games or rounds. We assume that the supplier
does not reveal the total number of available items m, nor the number of rounds
k a priori. In our analysis we assume that the agents play the Nash equilibrium
strategy myopically, in each individual round. This assumption is in line with the
maximin principle which states that rational agents will choose a strategy that
maximizes their minimum payoff. If agents never know whether any additional
items are going to be awarded in future rounds, they will try to maximize the
utility in the current round. In the Funding Game, this is equivalent to playing
the Nash equilibrium strategy.
As above, we use subscripts to indicate player index; we now use superscripts
to indicate round index. Let m1, ...,mk be the sizes of the bundles awarded
in rounds 1, ..., k respectively, with
∑k
t=1m
t = m. As before, the agents have
valuation functions vi : {0, ...,m} → R
+
0 , which are normalized (vi(0) = 0), are
nondecreasing, and exhibit diminishing marginal returns.
Let xti be the number of items requested by agent i in game t and let X
t
be the allocation vector for round t. Let αti =
∑
j=1,..,tX
j
i be the cumulative
number of items allocated to agent i in the first t games, with α0i = 0 for all
i. In round t, agent i’s valuation function vti is its marginal valuation given the
number of items received in the earlier rounds:
vti(x) = vi(x+ α
t−1
i )− vi(α
t−1
i )
Observe that these marginal valuations functions vti are normalized, are non-
decreasing and have diminishing marginal returns, just like the full valuation
functions vi. G
t will denote the Funding Game played at round t with mt items
and valuation functions vti . Observe that these individual Funding Games agents
are playing at each round depend on how items have been allocated in previous
rounds, and indirectly, on players’ strategies in previous rounds.
A strategy or request for agent i is a k-tuple si(x
1
i , ..., x
k
i ) = (s
1
i (x
1
i ), ..., s
k
i (x
k
i ))
where sti(x
t
i) = (x
t
i, v
t
i(x
t
i)) is the request of player i in game t. We use si as a
shorthand to denote the strategy of player i in G, and sti to denote the strategy
of player i in game t. A strategy profile for a k-round Funding Game will refer
to an n-tuple of strategies s = (s1, ..., sn) and a strategy profile for game G
t will
refer to the n-tuple of requests of players in round t, st = (st1, ..., s
t
n). For a strat-
egy profile s, we will write sw(s) =
∑n
i=1 vi(α
k
i ) for the social welfare of s. Let
sw(st) be the social welfare of st. Let ∆t = maxi v
t
i(1) be the highest marginal
value for one item for any agent in round t. Observe that ∆t is a nonincreasing
function of t.
Definition 2. Strategy profile s is a myopic equilibrium for the k-round Funding
Game if for each t, st is a Nash equilibrium of round t. The myopic Price of
Anarchy (PoA) bounds the ratio of the optimal social welfare and the social
welfare of the worst myopic equilibrium in any k-round Funding Game:
PoA = sup
v, myopic NE s
sw(OPT v)
sw(s)
Our goal is to analyze how a supplier should partition the m items into
bundles in order to obtain as good a PoA as possible. Theorem 2 in this section
shows how the PoA relates to the choices of bundle ratios, while in the next
section we find the bundle ratios that give the best PoA guarantees.
Lemma 2. For any myopic Nash equilibrium strategy profile s for a k-round
game, we have ∆t ≥ sw(s
t)
mt
≥ ∆t+1 for each t.
Proof: The first inequality follows from the definition of ∆t and the diminishing
returns assumption.
For the second inequality, suppose ∆t+1 > sw(s
t)
mt
. This would imply that
either some items are not allocated at st (impossible since st is Nash equilibrium
and by assumption ∆t+1 > 0) or that some winning player i has valuation-
per-item ratio
vti(x
t
i)
xt
i
< ∆t+1 = vt+1j (1), for some player j. But then j could
have successfully requested another item in game Gt, meaning st is not Nash
equilibrium, and so contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. For any myopic equilibrium s of a k-round Funding Game, we have:
sw(OPT ) ≤ sw(s) +∆k+1 ·
k∑
t=1
(
mt −
sw(st)
∆t
)
Theorem 2. Let yt = m
t/m1. The PoA of the k-round Funding Game with
bundle sizes mt is bounded by:
1 + sup
x1,...,xn:xi≥1
∑k
t=1 yt(1−
1
xt
)∑k
t=1 yt
∏k
i=t+1 xi
(1)
Proof. Let s be a myopic equilibrium for a k-round game. We will show that
there exist x1, ..., xk, xi ≥ 1, such that:
sw(OPT )
sw(s)
≤
∑k
t=1 yt(1−
1
xt
)∑k
t=1 yt
∏k
i=t+1 xi
From Lemma 3, we have:
sw(OPT ) ≤ sw(s) +∆k+1 ·
k∑
t=1
(
mt −
sw(st)
∆t
)
Let xt =
∆t
∆t+1
, which is at least 1 for each t. Since st is a Nash equilibrium for
round t, ∆t+1 ≤ sw(s
t)
mt
for each t.
Then we have:
sw(OPT )− sw(s) ≤ ∆k+1 ·
k∑
t=1
(
mt −
sw(st)
∆t
)
≤ ∆k+1 ·
k∑
t=1
mt
(
1−
∆t+1
∆t
)
≤ m1∆k+1 ·
k∑
t=1
yt
(
1−
1
xt
)
(2)
Observe that ∆t = ∆k+1
∏k
i=t xi. Therefore:
sw(s) =
k∑
t=1
sw(st) ≥
k∑
t=1
mt∆t+1 ≥ m1∆k+1 ·
k∑
t=1
yt ·
k∏
i=t+1
xi (3)
From (2) and (3) it follows that for any k-round game with bundle sizes mt,
there exist x1, ..., xk such that:
PoA = 1 + sup
sw(OPT )− sw(s)
sw(s)
≤ 1 + sup
xt≥1
∑k
t=1 yt
(
1− 1
xt
)
∑k
t=1 yt ·
∏k
i=t+1 xi
⊓⊔
5 Evaluating the PoA
In this section we present two results analyzing the expression (1) above. Theo-
rem 3 shows that supremum of this expression taken over all valid choices of xt
but fixing yt = t is 1/k. This corresponds to bundle sizes m1, 2 ·m1, ..., k ·m1 for
some m1, indicating that the PoA for such bundle sizes equals 1 + 1/k.
Second, we show that the min-sup of this expression, now also taken over
choices of yi, which corresponds to considering all possible choices of bundle
sizes, equals the same value 1/k, indicating that there is no better partition of
the items.
Theorem 3. Let
F (x1, ..., xk) =
k∑
i=1
i(1− 1
xi
)
k∑
i=1
i
k∏
j=i+1
xj
xi ≥ 1, i = 1, ..., k
Then sup
x
F (x) = 1
k
.
Proof. First observe that:
F (x) =
1− 1
x1
+
k∑
i=2
i(1− 1
xi
)
k∑
i=1
i
k∏
j=i+1
xj
< lim
x1→∞
F (x)
If we set xi =
i
i−1 , i = 2, ..., k, we have limx1→∞
F (x) = 1
k
. It remains to show that
lim
x1→∞
F (x) ≤ 1
k
. We note that the following inequalities are equivalent:
lim
x1→∞
F (x) ≤
1
k
⇔ lim
x1→∞

 k∑
i=1
i
k∏
j=i+1
xj − k
k∑
i=1
i(1−
1
xi
)

 ≥ 0⇔
lim
x1→∞
(
k∑
i=1
(izi + ik ·
zi
zi−1
)−
k∑
i=1
ik
)
≥ 0, (4)
where zi =
k∏
j=i+1
xj , i = 1, ..., k − 1; zk = 1; z0 = x1z1
Now define a function C : [0,∞)k−1 → R, C(z) =
k∑
i=1
(izi + ik ·
zi
zi−1
) −
k∑
i=1
ik.
Notice that C is a function of k − 1 variables since z0 and zk are fixed. Also
notice that the domain of C strictly includes the domain of z as defined in Eq.
(4). To complete the proof, we show that C(z) ≥ 0 for any z ∈ [0,∞)k−1. We
will do this in two steps: (i) showing that C(z) has a unique stationary point,
and then (ii) showing that C(z) ≥ 0 at any of the domain boundaries and the
stationary point.
C(z) has a unique stationary point. Let a = (a1, ..., ak−1) be a stationary
point for function C, and let a0 = z0 = x1z1 and ak = zk = 1:
∂C
∂zi
(a) = i+
ik
ai−1
− k(i+ 1)
ai+1
a2i
= 0, i = 1, ..., k − 1 (5)
We show now by induction that each ai can be written as a function of a1. For
the base case, let a0 = x1 · a1 = f0(a1) and f1(a1) = a1.
Now assume that ai−1 = fi−1(a1) and ai = fi(a1). Then we will define ai+1 as
a function of a1 as follows. From Eq. (5) we can infer:
ai+1 =
(
i+
ik
ai−1
)
·
a2i
k(i+ 1)
ai+1 =
(
i+
ik
fi−1(a1)
)
·
f2i (a1)
k(i + 1)
, fi+1(a1) (6)
where fi+1(·) is the name given to the expression in Eq. (6) as a function of a1.
Therefore the equations ai = fi(a1), i = 1, ..., k− 1 uniquely define a stationary
point a with respect to a1. To show that the stationary point a is unique, we only
need to show that fk(a1) = 1 has a unique solution. For this it is sufficient to
show that the derivative of fk with respect to a1 is always positive: f
′
k(a1) > 0.
We show this by induction on i = 0, ..., k. Let hi =
fi
fi−1
, i = 2, ..., k − 1.
The inductive hypothesis is that f ′i(a1) > 0, i = 1, ..., k and hj(a1) > 0 and
h′j(a1) > 0, j = 2, ..., k.
For the base case, observe the following:
f1(a1) = a1 > 0 and f
′
1(a1) = 1 > 0
f2(a1) =
x1a
2
1 + ka1
2kx1
and f ′2(a1) =
2x1a1 + k
2kx1
> 0
h2(a1) =
f2(a1)
f1(a1)
=
x1a1 + k
2kx1
> 0 and h′2(a1) =
x1
2kx1
> 0
Now assume that f ′i(a1) > 0, hi(a1) > 0, and h
′
i(a1) > 0. We then observe that
f ′i+1(a1), hi+1(a1) and h
′
i+1(a1) are all strictly positive:
f ′i+1(a1) = h
′
i(a1) · fi(a1) + hi(a1) · f
′
i(a1) > 0
hi+1(a1) =
(
i+
ik
fi−1(a1)
)
·
fi(a1)
k(i+ 1)
=
i
k(i+ 1)
fi(a1) +
i
i+ 1
· hi(a1) > 0
h′i+1(a1) =
i
k(i+ 1)
f ′i(a1) +
i
i + 1
· h′i(a1) > 0
This shows that the equation fk(a1) = 1 has a unique solution, and thus con-
cludes step (i).
C(z) ≥ 0 at all boundary points and at the unique stationary point.
First observe that ai =
k
i
satisfies Eq. (6), i = 1, ..., k and hence a = (a1, ..., ak−1)
is the unique stationary point for C. Now we show that C(a) ≥ 0:
C(a) =
k∑
i=1
(iai + ik ·
ai
ai−1
)−
k∑
i=1
ik =
k∑
i=1
(k + k(i− 1))−
k∑
i=1
ik = 0
Let b = (b1, ..., bk−1) be a boundary point. Then we must show that C(b) ≥
0. Since b is a boundary point there must exist j such that bj = 0 or bj =∞:
C(b) =
k∑
i=1
(ibi + ik ·
bi
bi−1
)−
k∑
i=1
ik
The only negative term is
∑k
i=1 ik, which is constant with respect to b. If
bj = 0 for some j, then the positive term (i+1)k ·
bi+1
bi
is infinite and C(b) > 0.
On the other hand, if bj =∞ for some j, then the positive term ik ·
bi
bi+1
is infinite
and again C(b) > 0. Steps (i) and (ii) above show that C(z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ [0,∞)k−1
and therefore C(z) ≥ 0 on the restricted domain of equation (4), which completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. The PoA for the k-round Funding Games with bundle ratios mt
m1
=
t is 1 + 1
k
.
Theorem 4. Let
G(x,y) =
k∑
i=1
yi(1 −
1
xi
)
k∑
i=1
yi
k∏
j=i+1
xj
yi ≥ 0; xi ≥ 1, i = 1, ..., k
Then min
y
sup
x
G(x,y) = 1
k
.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we introduced the Funding Game, a novel formulation of resource
allocation for agents whose valuation declarations can be verified, but reveal only
partial information. We analyzed the PoA for the pure and Bayesian Nash equi-
librium and showed that allocating the resources in multiple successive rounds
can improve the pure PoA arbitrarily close to 1. There are two directions in
which this work can be extended. First, our mechanism relies on the assumption
that the valuation functions are concave. An interesting open problem is find-
ing an efficient mechanism for general valuation functions. Second, it might be
desirable to develop efficient verification mechanisms for combinatorial settings,
where players’ valuation functions are defined on subsets of items.
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